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ABSTRACT
TANF FUNDING ALLOCATION DIFFERENCES IN RED VS. BLUE STATES:
EMPHASIS ON OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS AND DIVORCES
by
Camille Mindrum, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2018

Major Professor: Dr. Peter McNamara
Department: Political Science
In 1996, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) replaced Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) after Republicans who had promised
significant welfare reform captured the House of Representatives in 1994. Like AFDC,
TANF serves as a safety net that provides cash assistance to needy families, but it also
attempts to incentivize values such as work ethic and two-parent family formation in
order to reduce government dependence. Previous studies of TANF have relied on shortterm economic trends and number of caseloads to measure success, but failed to analyze
the program’s success based on its original goals. Many of its goals were driven by the
consensus that family structure is important for economic and social stability, so this
research examined TANF funding allocation and social outcome differences between
predominantly Republican (red) and predominantly Democratic (blue) states in order
analyze TANF’s ability to reduce out-of-wedlock birth rates and divorce rates.
The analysis of variance tests (one and two-way ANOVAs) provided limited, but
interesting, evidence that there were differences in the average funding allocation red and
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blue states provide for each TANF spending category. On average, red states allocated
greater proportions of their funding to categories that were authorized solely under AFDC
and otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of TANF than blue states. Additionally, outof-wedlock birth rates and divorce rates were different in 1996 (pre-TANF) and 2016
(post-TANF), but there was little evidence that these changes can be attributed to TANF.
Similarly, blue states had significantly less divorces than red states, but it is unlikely that
TANF is responsible for this difference. This is largely because states maintain a lot of
discretion in how they implement TANF and most states provided very limited funding to
the goals associated with family structure.
(60 pages)

v

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

TANF FUNDING ALLOCATION DIFFERENCES IN RED VS. BLUE STATES:
EMPHASIS ON OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS AND DIVORCES

Camille Mindrum

The 1996 welfare reforms were part of a bipartisan consensus led by Democratic
President Bill Clinton and a Republican Congress about the downfalls of the existing
United States welfare system. Under these reforms, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which was
an entitlement program that had been in effect since 1935. Similar to AFDC, TANF
intended to serve as a safety net that provides cash assistance to needy families, but it
also aimed to reduce government dependence by attempting to instill values in welfare
recipients through stricter work requirements and eligibility criteria. The goals of TANF
included promoting job preparation, reducing the incidence of births to unmarried
mothers, and increasing the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.
Many of TANF’s goals were driven by the theory that family structure is
important for economic and social stability, but states have a lot of freedom in how they
choose to distribute TANF funding and implement the program. This research examined
TANF funding allocation and social outcome differences between predominantly
Republican (red) and predominantly Democratic (blue) states in order analyze TANF’s
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ability to reduce out-of-wedlock birth rates and divorce rates. There was limited, but
interesting, evidence that there were differences in how red and blue states were funding
TANF programs. On average, red states allocated greater proportions of their funding to
categories that were inconsistent with the purposes of TANF than blue states. Most states
provided very little funding to goals associated with family structure. So, while out-ofwedlock birth rates and divorce rates were different in 1996 (pre-TANF) and 2016 (postTANF), these changes are unlikely associated with the program. Similarly, blue states
had significantly less divorces than red states, but it is unlikely that TANF is responsible
for this difference.
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INTRODUCTION
After the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996 (P.L. 104-193) was signed into law, President Clinton had fulfilled
his campaign promise to “end welfare as we know it” by supplanting the previous welfare
system with a comprehensive reform. The Act was a bipartisan compromise and strongly
supported by Republicans who had promised significant welfare reform when they
captured the House of Representatives in 1994. Under PRWORA, Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
AFDC was a cash assistance program for low-income families established in 1935 under
the Social Security Act signed into law by Franklin D. Roosevelt. As its replacement,
TANF continued to provide basic assistance to low-income families, but it also aimed to
end dependence through enforcement of stricter regulations on welfare recipients such as
work requirements and lifetime limits. In many ways, the new bill was an attempt to
legislate morality through efforts to instill work ethic, increase formation of two-parent
families, and reduce out-of-wedlock births. It was also a response to criticisms of AFDC,
which included beliefs about incentivizing broken families, dishonesty, and failure to stay
in the workforce (Banfield 1969). Over two decades later, the implications of this
bipartisan law are still fiercely debated, so whether restructuring the welfare system was
effective in achieving its goals and amending problems associated with the previous
system is still unclear.
Unlike AFDC, where states were entitled to unlimited federal funds at matching
rates, TANF is administered as a block grant provided to states that is capped federally at
$16.5 billion per year (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 2009). States can
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use their funds “in any way that supports one of the four statutory purposes of TANF”
subject to few restrictions (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 2009). These
four goals are: “(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for
in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents
on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent
and reduce the incidence of out of wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical
goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage
the formation and maintenance of two parent families” (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities 2015). While states are supposed to justify how they are distributing federal
funds with one of these goals, there are exceptions and they are largely free to allocate
funds however they deem fit. As a result, there are differences between states and
furthermore, there seem to be differences between how predominantly Republican (red)
and predominantly Democratic (blue) states are implementing TANF—especially when
spending categories are characterized based on TANF’s goals.
Given the context of TANF’s goals, especially those based on family values,
comparing Republican states to Democratic states makes sense because conservatives
seem to be more protective of the traditional institution of the family. For example, red
states have been more hesitant to adopt policies such as same sex marriage and
comprehensive sex education. Still, a recent article in the New York Times proclaimed,
“Yet if one looks at blue and red state populations as a whole, it’s striking that
conservatives champion ‘family values’ even as red states have high rates of teenage
births, divorce and prostitution (Kristof 2017). In contrast, “people in blue states don’t
trumpet these family values but often seem to do a better job living them” (Kristof 2017).
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It is not merely holding conservative values that lead to these outcomes, though; “the
deeper problem seems to be the political choices that conservatives make,” such as
“underinvesting in public education and social services” (Kristof 2017). Some of these
political choices include the implementation of abstinence-based sex education programs
and limited access to birth control. These policy choices, as well as decisions about how
to implement TANF, could therefore have serious implications on social outcomes and
economic inequality in states. The goal of this thesis is to examine these claims in a more
limited but more systematic way by analyzing TANF policy implementation as well as
the differences in social implications between red and blue states.
Other policy choices, in addition to TANF, could be responsible for changes in
rates of births to unmarried mothers and divorces. The reason for analyzing TANF is
because it replaced AFDC, which was seen by many as propagating these “social ills”
(e.g. Banfield 1969). Compared to AFDC, which forced the federal and state
governments to work together on welfare cases, TANF leaves decision making largely to
the states themselves, which makes comparing differences between states possible and
interesting (Blank 1997). TANF is also not the only new policy under PRWORA or the
only contemporary welfare program. The reason it is the focus of this thesis is because it
is more diverse in its function than programs like Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) or
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), making it easier to draw more
meaningful comparisons.
TANF’s goals were an attempt to instill values in welfare participants in hopes of
decreasing their economic dependency. There were several trends that drove welfare
reform, including: households headed by single mothers are generally poorer and
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therefore more likely to be receiving support from the government (e.g. Brush 2003;
Legler 1996). Authors such as Robert Putnam (2016) have pointed to the importance of
family structure, child development, and parenting have on inequality (248-51). More
specifically, Brush (2003) claims, “central to the moralistic rhetoric of welfare reform
[that was justified by the political right and left alike] were claims about the nonpecuniary value of, as well as the economic rewards for, waged work, sexual restraint,
and paternal involvement” (176). The Progressive Policy Institute, a policy think-tank
central to the Clinton administration, published Mandate For Change, where Kamarck
and Galston (1993) state, “The reality, we believe, is this: America’s children are in
trouble, and their troubles are rooted in both economic stress and family disintegration”
(153). They continue, “Not only have recent decades seen an increase in one-parent
families as the result of rising out-of-wedlock births and rising divorce rates, they have
also seen an increase in the poverty of those families” (Kamarck and Galston 1993, 15759). In short, they believed that there is a significant correlation between family structure
and the economic well-being of families. Leading Republicans held similar views and the
1996 welfare reforms were influenced by this theory.
Section 101 of PRWORA (P.L. 104-193) focuses on marriage, single-parent
families, out-of-wedlock births, and teenage pregnancies. The law states, “The increase in
the number of children receiving public assistance is closely related to the increase in
births to unmarried women.” Furthermore, “Children born out-of-wedlock are 3 times
more likely to be on welfare when they grow up,” and, moreover, “Only 9 percent of
married-couple families with children under 18 years of age have income below the
national poverty level. In contrast, 46 percent of female-headed households with children
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under 18 years of age are below the national poverty level” (P.L. 104-193, § 101). These
facts, and many more, were used as economic and social justifications to use public
policy in order to reduce out-of-wedlock births and increase the formation of two-parent
families.
The family has long been recognized as a vital political institution. Alexis de
Tocqueville points to the role families play in rearing children and educating children
(2000, 558-562). According to Scott Yenor in Family Politics (2015), the ideas of John
Locke suggested, “The educative goals of the family precede the goals of political
society, for the family cultivates the rationality, civility, character, and perhaps, technical
skills that allow children to become members of civil government” (29). Recently, Steven
Horwitz (2015) has argued that, “the family is a necessary institution in any society …
The advantages that parents have in socializing children, for example, cannot be
replicated sufficiently by schools, ‘the village,’ or the state ... even if parents are
imperfect at doing so, that is not an ipso facto argument for someone else to step in, as
those other institutions may be even worse at the task than imperfect parents” (7).
Horwitz recognizes that family structure and purposes change over time. The essential
question form him is whether current family structure is accomplishing its social
objectives, especially with respect to children.
Authors such as Putnam (2015) and Murray (2012) have identified a significant
divergence in familial traits between economic classes in the contemporary United States.
For example, members of higher economic classes are more inclined to be married and
have children within, as opposed to outside of, those marriages. In a recent Op-Ed, Wax
and Alexander (2017) make similar claims in a more controversial way, claiming that not
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all cultures are created equal when it comes to economic success. While it is important to
consider how the economic situation of each family plays a role in children’s outcomes
(e.g. a wealthy single mother will face less economic barriers in providing for her
children than impoverished married parents will for theirs), trends provide evidence that
family structure and economic success are closely related. In general, “Women and men
who have children outside of marriage … have less education, and have lower income
than married parents” (Shattuck and Kreider 2013, 1). According to U.S. Census data,
“Percentages of women with a birth in the last year who were unmarried decreased with
each sequentially higher income level. Women with a birth in the last year at the lowest
household income level—less than $10,000 per year—had the highest percentage, 68.9
percent, who were unmarried. In contrast, just 9 percent of women whose household
income in 2010 was $200,000 or above had a recent birth were unmarried” (Shattuck and
Kreider 2013, 4-5).
Prior to the 1960s, the attributes of the American family that are often associated
with positive economic outcomes, such as two-parent households, occurred “naturally”
—due to societal pressures that discouraged things such as child bearing out of wedlock
and divorce and an economic structure that presumed women would give up work for
family. Over time, the “traditional” institution of the family, which is exemplified by the
nuclear family of the 1950s and Alexis de Tocqueville’s depiction of the American
family in Democracy in America, has evolved and several diverse family forms have
appeared. Paul Legler (1996) claims,
We have seen the American family undergo dramatic structural changes in the last
thirty years. The skyrocketing increase in the rate of out-of-wedlock births
coupled with the high rate of divorce means that more and more families are
single parent families. The custodial parent in these single parent families is often
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the sole source of financial support, and since that parent is often a mother with
low income, millions of children are subject to childhood poverty (520-21).
Because the replacement of the “traditional” family by alternative family forms
has occurred more frequently in the lower economic classes (see, e.g. Murray 2012;
Putnam 2016) and some of these changes, such as an increase in single-parent families
(including never-married and divorced couples) and out-of-wedlock births, are associated
with social ills such as unemployment, drug usage, and incarceration (Murray 2012;
Putnam 2016; Wax and Alexander 2017), TANF’s objective was multifaceted. Like
AFDC, it served as a safety net by providing cash assistance to needy families. Unlike its
predecessor, though, it also attempted to incentivize values tied to the traditional family
because of the consensus that family structure is important for economic and social
stability. Incentivizing these “family values,” similar to attempting to instill work ethic,
occurred in hopes of decreasing government dependence. Because of this, it is important
to consider whether TANF has been successful in its third and fourth goals, which were
postulated based on the relationship between family structure, economic success, and
social stability. In addition to normative questions about whether or not the government
should attempt to interfere with private institutions such as the family, it is important to
consider if the government has had the capacity to do so effectively.
Family formation goals were not the only value-based components of PRWORA.
Welfare reforms under the Clinton Administration were a response to concerns about
government dependency and a decline in work ethic that came largely from the political
right. Edward Banfield (1969) saw AFDC as problematic because despite it being a time
of low unemployment, welfare rolls were expanding (89). He suggested several potential
reasons for the increasing caseload, including the effects of payment levels increasing
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and causing welfare to become more attractive as a “job” and the role of welfare
bureaucracies, who through various Great Society programs taught people to “regard
welfare as something that is theirs by right” (Banfield 1969, 90-93). AFDC was opposed
by “resentful taxpayers as well as by the poor themselves, because it made no provision
for employment or training” (Frank 2017, 94-95). TANF aimed to remedy these
complaints by making support work-conditioned and time-limited (U.S. Congressional
Research Service 2003). While the concern about work ethic was a large component of
both PRWORA and TANF, it is not the focus of this project. Instead, I look primarily at
the facets of welfare reform that were based on the class divide in family structure. They
comprise half of TANF’s primary goals and are less accounted for in the current
literature. The third and fourth goals of TANF are fascinating because they are based on
the logic that certain family structures are more economically advantageous and socially
beneficial than others. Two-parent households are generally associated with higher levels
of economic success than single-parent families. TANF is an explicit attempt by the
government to influence the institution of the family through public policy. Has the
policy has had any effect on out-of-wedlock births and the formation of two-parent
families?
Consequently, I have two primary research questions: 1) How do predominantly
Republican (red) and predominantly Democratic (blue) states allocate TANF funding? 2)
What are the differences in the average out-of-wedlock birth rate and divorce rate
between red and blue states in 1996 and 2016? The first question asks how TANF is
being implemented in each state. By pairing each TANF spending category with one of
the four goals, figuring out differences between how red and blue states are implementing
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TANF was more straightforward. I analyzed differences between red and blue states by
running a one-way analysis of variance to determine whether there is a statistically
significant difference between the proportion of funding red and blue states are allocating
to each goal. There were not statistically significant differences between the percentages
of funds red and blue states were allocating to the primary goals of TANF, but some
spending categories do not fall under any of the four goals. For instance, some categories
are authorized solely under prior law (AFDC) and otherwise inconsistent with the goals
of TANF altogether. I found red states were more likely than blue states to distribute
funds to these spending categories, which is interesting based on recent findings about
red states such as Louisiana and Texas diverting welfare funds to fill budget holes and
using substantial portions their TANF block grant for uses with “little or no connection to
the program’s main goals” (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2016; Uri 2017).
The second question attempts to gauge TANF’s ability to reduce the rates of
births to unmarried mothers and divorce since both of these are specific goals of the
program. I decided to focus on divorce (two-parent family maintenance) because in order
to consider marriage (two-parent family formation), the question of how marriage and
cohabitation differ becomes more of an obstacle. In order to gauge differences in out-ofwedlock birth and divorce rates before and after TANF, I looked at whether rates in outof-wedlock births and divorce have changed since TANF’s advent in order to determine
whether the policy is associated with rising or falling rates of the social outcomes
associated with the program’s goals. This is important because in order to consider the
success of TANF in its ability to influence family forms, I had to determine whether there
has been a reduction of out-of-wedlock births and an increased maintenance of two-
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parent families since both of these are goals of the policy. While outside variables
definitely play a role in these rates, determining general trends still provides insight about
how effective TANF has been.
Since 1997, divorce rates have decreased, but out-of-wedlock births have
increased. Both findings were statistically significant. Because I found some differences
in how red and blue states allocated TANF funds, I was also interested in analyzing
differences in out-of-wedlock birth and divorce rates between red and blue states. In
order to do this, I used a two-way ANOVA to analyze rates of divorce and out-ofwedlock births in red and blue states before and after TANF was implemented. On
average, there are fewer divorces in blue states, but there is no statistically significant
difference in out-of-wedlock births between red and blue states. This analysis adds new
and interesting elements to the current TANF debate. Instead of focusing strictly on how
TANF is fairing as a cash assistance program in comparison to AFDC, this research also
considers the value-laden goals that distinguish the program from its predecessor. The
differences I found are interesting, but probably largely unrelated to TANF. Out-ofwedlock birth rates have been increasing at a constant rate since at least 1940 when data
collection began—over 50 years before TANF was introduced (Bachrach 1998; Doyle
2006). Understanding the decrease in divorce rate is more complicated, but could be
related to cohabitation becoming less stigmatized (Abrams 2016). Additionally, if
cohabitation is more common in blue states, this could indicate differences between
divorce rates between red and blue states; if fewer people are getting married, especially
at young ages, in blue states it would make sense that the divorce rate was lower.

11
PREVIOUS FINDINGS
Mixed Findings of TANF Outcomes
In order to consider the success of TANF, it is critical to examine whether or not
the program is effective—or has the capability of being effective—in achieving its more
complex goals, such as increasing two-parent family formation. TANF’s purpose extends
beyond providing a safety net to the nation’s poorest; its goals aimed at decreasing
government dependence by instilling values in welfare recipients. Therefore, simply
examining caseloads or short-term economic implications is not enough to determine the
success of welfare reform. Other factors such as social implications related to family
structure need to be considered as well.
Previous findings about the results of TANF are mixed. They often focus on
reduction in caseloads as well as broad economic trends such as increased employment
among single mothers (Teitler et al. 2009; Ziliak 2005). These findings are interesting,
but they are not a complete measure in determining the success of TANF. Part of the
reason for caseload reduction can be attributed to the cap on federal funding, which is
only slightly higher than fiscal year 1995 federal expenditures (U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services 2009). Conservative states could also be creating obstacles for
welfare recipients to receive funding due to ideological beliefs about welfare. Moreover,
most studies look at short-term implications, but fail to analyze more long-term effects of
welfare reform (Acs and Loprest 2001; Cancian and Meyer 2004). Findings from
Cancian and Meyer (2004) further demonstrate the difficulty in measuring TANF’s
success, which they claim has been obscured in previous research by inconsistent
measures of success as well as other measurement difficulties. Cancian and Meyer (2004)
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look at three different indicators of economic well-being of previous participants:
independence from government assistance, whether their income level above the
threshold of poverty, and “freedom from material hardship.” Their findings highlight the
variance between these measures of success: “Although the three concepts of overlap
substantially, they appear to capture different aspects of success” (545). In fact, very few
families in their study failed in all three indicators and even fewer succeeded by all
measures (Cancian and Meyer 2004).
Wood, Moore, and Rangarajan (2008) found on average, that TANF recipients
experience economic progress—including increased employment and income levels—in
the years following exit of the program, but not without limits. Of their sample
population, income levels remained fairly low, with almost half of participants with
incomes remaining below the poverty line (Wood, Moore, and Rangarajan 2008, 24).
Parrott and Sherman (2007) found several negative trends following TANF, such as
recent increases in child poverty rates, single mother employment rates falling, and
smaller shares of families that are poor enough to qualify for the program benefitting
from the program or participating at all. They state, “our safety net for the poorest
families with children has weakened dramatically” (Parrott and Sherman 2007, 375). In
sum, there are several problems with the current TANF debate: many case studies focus
solely on short-term implications, measures of success are inconsistent throughout the
literature, studies that focus on caseloads miss other economic trends, and several studies
overlook the social trends that inspired the law. The connection family stability has with
welfare dependence and intergenerational poverty is worth being considered. By looking
at social trends—such as out-of-wedlock birth and divorce rates—20 years after TANF
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was implemented, I provide insight about the more long-term implications of the welfare
program that are not centered on caseloads or economic trends alone. This analysis
provides an important starting place for restructuring the welfare debate.
TANF Implementation: Differences Between States
Another problem with the contemporary TANF discussion is that it focuses on
national trends without enough recognition of state differences. While looking at national
trends is important, there is evidence that states fund welfare differently, especially since
the advent of TANF. Looking at funding is important because it has been found to be one
component of effective welfare programs within states (Rodgers 2005). A report by
Assessing the New Federalism and The Urban Institute found, “Spending on child
welfare activities varied considerably among the states” and “although TANF and
Medicaid accounted for nearly all the federal increase nationally, TANF spending
declined in 17 states and Medicaid spending declined in 12 states” (Scarcella et al. 2004,
31-32). The report acknowledges the difficulty in explaining the significant variation
across states, but claims it is probably the “result of a complex array of state-specific
issues” and not due to caseload differences alone (Scarcella et al. 2004, 32).
Brueckner (2000) provides evidence that replacing federal matching grants
(AFDC) with block grants (TANF) created a “race to the bottom” between states, where
the incentive to spend more due to matching federal funds is replaced with spending less
through fear of becoming a “welfare magnet” (522). Additionally, states “attempting to
reduce caseloads can devise administrative mechanisms that will make it easier for them
to cut families off assistance or prevent families from coming on assistance” in the first
place (Lurie 1997). This runs contrary to Banfield’s (1969) suggestion that welfare
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bureaucracies under AFDC were responsible for increasing welfare rolls, which might
indicate bureaucracy operation is dependent on state ideology—with red states more
inclined to decrease caseloads while blue states increase caseloads. In a chapter titled
TANF Funding and Spending across the States, Zedlewski et al. (2002) discussed other
fears that came with moving to block-grant financing, stating some analysts believed
“that states would use TANF dollars to supplant other spending rather than expand
services for low-income families” or that “basing TANF allocations on pre-PRWORA
funding,” would lock in existing inequalities in spending and benefits across the states”
(225-226). These concerns existed because unlike under AFDC, where “the federal
government paid at least half of all benefit costs on an open-ended basis, with federal
welfare spending increasing as AFDC caseloads rose,” TANF “is funded as a block grant,
providing a fixed sum ($16.5 billion per year) through fiscal year 2002” (Peterson 2002,
433).
Some of these predictions have materialized. A report by the Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities points to how the inequitable beginnings of TANF have only grown
more inequitable over the last two decades—with poor states receiving fewer federal
dollars per poor child than richer states (2017). This is partially because the state
maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement locked in lower state spending obligations for
poorer states, which created “a greater overall disparity in total TANF funding available
per poor child among the states” (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2017). For
example, in 1997 the TANF spending per poor child ranged from $462 in Arkansas to
$2,860 in Connecticut (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2017). Additionally, states
such as Louisiana have been found using TANF funds for other uses with “little or no
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connection to the program’s main goals,” (Center for Budget and Policy Priorities 2016).
Similarly, in Texas, funding is being used to fill “budget holes” or fund “other programs
that provide services to residents with higher incomes than those who qualify for cash
welfare” (Ura 2017). If some states are using TANF funds for alternative purposes and
welfare benefits are not reaching the impoverished people, finding out which states are
diverting funds is important. It turns out there is a partisan pattern in TANF funding, with
predominantly Republican states providing less TANF funds to families in poverty within
their state than predominantly Democratic states.
Of the ten states allotting benefits to the fewest number of families in poverty, all
voted for the Republican Presidential nominee in the great majority (at least 5 of 6) of the
last six elections (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2017). Of the ten states allotting
benefits to the greatest number of families in poverty, all but one voted for the
Democratic Presidential nominee in every election since 1996; the exception was Alaska,
who ranked 10th and voted for the Republican nominee in every election since 1996
(Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2017). Table 1 illustrates the top and bottom ten
states with party identification. While this divergence might be in part due to wealth of
each state, especially in the case of Alaska (one of the wealthiest states in the U.S.), the
pattern of differences between red and blue states cannot be ignored. If, for example, red
states were diverting TANF funds toward programs that do not provide a safety net for
their poorest citizens more frequently than blue states, this would be a significant finding.
Another possibility is red states being poorer and having lower MOE requirements on
average, causing fewer poor children to receive aid within these states.
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Table 1
Top and Bottom 10 States Allocating TANF Benefits to Needy Families
State

Party ID

Louisiana
Texas
Wyoming
Georgia
Arkansas
Indiana
Arizona
North Carolina
Oklahoma
Idaho

Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican

Number of Families with Children Receiving TANF
Benefits for Every 100 Families with Children in
Poverty
Less than 5
Less than 10
Less than 10
Less than 10
Less than 10
Less than 10
Less than 10
Less than 10
Less than 10
Less than 10

Alaska
Republican
Massachusetts Democratic
Rhode Island
Democratic
Delaware
Democratic
Hawaii
Democratic
New York
Democratic
Oregon
Democratic
Minnesota
Democratic
Vermont
Democratic
California
Democratic
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2017

Rank

More than 30
More than 30
More than 30
More than 35
About 40
About 40
More than 40
More than 40
More than 50
More than 60

50
49
48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

Political variables are not always included in TANF caseload studies, but some
scholars who include it have found statistically significant effects (Bentele and Nicoli
2012, 229). Fellowes and Rowe (2004) find “liberal states have less strict eligibility
policies than conservative states”—illustrating the important role constituent ideology
plays in TANF policy. Soss et al. (2001) demonstrated that states with more liberal
governments are more likely to adopt less restrictive TANF policies. Some researchers
have found AFDC and TANF caseloads decreased more dramatically in states with
Republican governors or more conservative state legislatures (Bentele and Nicoli 2012;
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Blank 2001). These differences make sense given each ideology’s beliefs about
government assistance and dependence. In more recent works, though, (e.g. Soss,
Fording, and Schram 2011, as cited in Bentele and Nicoli 2012) party control and state
government ideology provide little insight about which TANF policies states adopt, so
careful examination of whether or not party variables are actually driving differences
between states deserves careful consideration.
In order to discern differences in how red and blue states have implemented
TANF, I looked at funding allocation differences. Comparing where states are
apportioning the greatest sums of money provides insight about which components of
TANF red and blue states view as most important. Because states have almost complete
freedom if they can justify their decisions under one of the four goals of TANF, I
assigned each spending category to one goal. That way, I could compare differences
between which goals were receiving the largest sums of funding in each state. While case
studies examining specific provisions (e.g. how marriage counseling programs are being
instituted in each state) might provide more detailed information about implementation
within each state, this method provides a larger overview of TANF funding differences
more generally. Accordingly, my first hypothesis is the following.
Hypothesis 1: Predominantly Republican states allocate different percentages of
their funding to each goal of TANF than predominantly Democratic states
Social Value Goals and Outcomes of TANF
Research on the welfare reforms tends to focus on the economic as opposed to
social implications. This could be because “the family formation objectives in TANF are
notably free from accountability measures” or because “states have few precedents to
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follow instructing programs to increase the marriage and two-parent family rates in the
welfare population” (Lawrence 2007, 130). With little demand from the federal
government on the states to promote family formation goals, there is considerable
variation in implementation, even across similar (e.g. abstinence) provisions (Lawrence
2007). Still, two of the four goals of TANF revolve around family structure and are worth
being evaluated. This does not mean the first and second goals are not important. In fact,
a more comprehensive study of TANF’s success would require careful analysis of all four
goals. The analysis here is limited to the two goals associated primarily with the
institution of the family.
Multiple studies on the relationship between levels of welfare benefits and rates of
marriage, divorce, and out-of-wedlock births pre-PRWORA/TANF found little or no
correlation (e.g. Lundberg and Plotnick 1990; Plotnick and Lundberg 1995). Results after
the advent of TANF are similar; there is little evidence that welfare waivers affected the
number of families headed by females or that family cap policies, which deny additional
assistance to families who have additional children while on assistance (National
Conference of State Legislatures 2011), have reduced out-of-wedlock births (Fizgerald
and Ribar 2004; Dyer and Fairlie 2004). Teitler et al. (2009) actually found current and
past TANF participation reduced the likelihood of marriage, but this effect was confined
to the period of participation in the program and prospects of marriage returned to levels
similar to women who have never participated in TANF after program exits. Research on
social trends more generally shows a steady increase of out-of-wedlock births since 1940,
providing some evidence that TANF has not had any “discernible effect on births to
unwed mothers” (Bachrach 1998, 16; Doyle 2006, 25). However, some of these trends
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could be related to TANF’s work requirements, which indirectly affect family structure
because requiring mothers, especially single mothers, to work in order to receive benefits,
forces women out of the domestic sphere and into the workforce.
More general trends provide evidence that social attributes associated with family
structure are changing, especially in lower classes (e.g. Murray 2012). Out-of-wedlock
births have been steadily increasing nationwide for over 75 years, but the number of
children born to unmarried women is higher in the lower classes (Murray 2012; Putnam
2016). Contemporary media has praised the recent drop in divorce rate despite the rising
number of marriages, but these numbers also vary by social class and education—with
the “wealthy and well-educated” more likely to get married and stay together than “those
who are less well-off” (Abrams 2016). I expect my analysis to yield similar results: outof-wedlock birth rates have increased since TANF was implemented, while divorce rates
have dropped. For TANF to be successful in terms of its third and fourth goals, both outof-wedlock births and divorces would have to decline. I argue neither of these outcomes
is primarily due to TANF because limited program funding has thwarted its ability to
yield any real effects. Moreover, divorce rates and out-of-wedlock birth rates have
remained consistently higher in lower classes (e.g. Abrams 2016; Murray 2012; Putnam
2016), which further speaks to TANF’s inability to instill values in welfare participants
overall.
Hypothesis 2: The average out-of-wedlock birth rate and divorce rate are
different in 1996 (pre-TANF) and 2016 (post-TANF)
Social Values and Trends in Red vs. Blue States
Social trends, such as teen birth rates, the use of abortion, and divorce do seem to
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vary by state ideology (e.g. Cahn and Carbone 2010; Kristof 2017). Red states,
particularly in the south, tend to have higher teen birthrates, fewer abortions, and a higher
percentage of teen births occurring within marriage (Cahn and Carbone 2010, 24). At
least in part, this is dependent on things such as minority population size and abundance
of urban neighborhoods, so trends are not determined by state ideology alone. Regardless
of other variables, there is still a notable difference in social trends between red and blue
states that is worth being examined. Based on previous literature comparing social trends
in red and blue states, I expect to find more frequent incidents of out-of-wedlock birth
and divorce rates in red states compared to blue states. These differences cannot be
attributed to state ideology alone, but comparing how social trends vary by state ideology
can still provide some information about why these differences are occurring.
Like the changes in rates of out-of-wedlock births and divorce from 1996 to 2016,
I expect most of the differences in social trends between red and blue states are unrelated
to TANF. Two-parent family formation and maintenance were major goals of TANF, but
most of the funding, which is limited in comparison to AFDC, is still allocated to basic
assistance. In addition to carrying less weight than providing a safety net for the nation’s
poorest families, the remaining goals of TANF are largely value-based and incentivizing
them with funding alone is difficult. Further, some programs that support TANF’s valueladen goals, such as work and training programs, are less complex to implement than
others, such as programs that can effectively promote responsible fatherhood. The third
and fourth goals, which aim at increasing two-parent family formation and maintenance
as well as reducing births to unmarried mothers, are difficult to implement effectively.
Hypothesis 3: Out-of-wedlock birth rates and divorce rates are higher in
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predominantly Republican states than predominantly Democratic states
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METHODOLOGY
In order to analyze differences in out-of-wedlock births and divorces in red and
blue states since TANF was implemented, this project covers the years 1996-2016. 1996
represents pre-TANF implementation because the law did not go into effect until July
1997. Many studies on welfare reform look at short-term implications, but fail to analyze
more long-term implications (Acs and Loprest 2001; Cancian and Meyer 2004). While 10
years (1997-2007) might have been a sufficient to determine the primary effects of
TANF, it would exclude the most current data. I decided to include several years
following the 2008 recession in order to avoid long-term trends being influenced by the
economic downturn. Some of my analyses simply compare 1996 to 2016; with 1996
representing conditions before TANF was implemented and 2016 representing modern
conditions. 2016 was used, as opposed to 2017 or 2018, because data is more readily
available and it kept the comparisons consistent.
Prior to running statistical analyses to test my hypotheses, I divided states into
political parties in order to compare “red” and “blue” states. Because I am examining
1996-2016, I used presidential election outcomes within each state in each year (1996,
2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016) to determine which party the state voted with most
frequently. If a state voted for one party in four or more out of the six elections, they were
assigned that party identification. For example, because Iowa voted for the Democratic
candidate in every year except 2004 and 2016, Iowa was considered a blue state for this
analysis. Because there were six election years and there was the possibility of an equal
distribution between Republican and Democratic presidential nominations within a state,
four states were considered “swing” states and therefore excluded from the analysis
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because my purpose was to compare red and blue states. These states include: Colorado,
Florida, Ohio, and Virginia. There were 24 red states and 22 blue states, which are
illustrated below.
Figure 1
State Party Identification Map

Source: Map created using mapchart.net

The Office of Family Assistance, which falls under the U.S. Department of Health
& Human Services, has comprehensive TANF spending data by state with a reader’s
guide providing explanations of what comprises each spending category (U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services Office of Family Assistance 2018). Using this
information, I paired each spending category with a TANF goal. For example, “Basic
Assistance,” which includes, “payments on behalf of children for whom the child welfare
agency does not have legal care and responsibility who are living with caretaker relatives
and child support pass-through payments” can be justified by the first TANF goal, which
is to “provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own
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homes or in the homes of relatives” (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
Office of Family Assistance 2018; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2015).
As mentioned earlier, some spending categories do not fall under any of the four
TANF goals. “Assistance Authorized Solely Under Prior Law” and “Non-Assistance
Authorized Solely Under Prior Law” comprise their own category, which I designated
none because they are authorized under AFDC and otherwise inconsistent with the
purposes of TANF (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services Office of Family
Assistance 2018). Funds allocated to these categories are authorized by Section 404(a)(2)
of PRWORA, which says states may use the grant “in any manner that the State was
authorized to use amounts received under part A or F, as such parts were in effect on
September 30, 1995” or, by state choice, on August 21, 1996 (P.L. 104-193; U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services Office of Family Assistance 2018). Part A is
referring to “Title IV-A (AFDC, AFDC Administration, Emergency Assistance, AFDC
Child Care, Transitional Child Care, and At-Risk Child Care)” and part F is referring to
“Title IV-F (JOBS)” (Greenberg and Savner 1996). In other words, activities funded in
these categories are allowable not because they coincide with the purpose of TANF, but
because they were in effect before PRWORA was implemented.
There is also an “other” category, which encompasses all miscellaneous nonassistance activities, as well as administrative costs, which are subject to a 15% cap, that
are separate because they are not inconsistent with TANF, but they do not specifically
align with any one of the four goals (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
Office of Family Assistance 2018; P.L. 104-193 § 404(b)). Finally, states are authorized
(under P.L. 104-193 § 404(d)(1)(2)) to transfer up to 30% of their grant to “other

25
purposes” including the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Discretionary and
the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG). Similar to programs authorized solely under
prior law, transferring funds to the CCDF or SSBG cannot be aligned with any TANF
goal because they are being transferred to alternative programs. In total, the 32 spending
categories were divided into nine groups. A full breakdown of which TANF goal or
justification each spending category was assigned to can be found below (Table 2).
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Table 2
TANF Spending Categories Associated with Each Goal or Justification
TANF Goal or Justification

(1) Provide assistance to needy families so that
children may be cared for in their own homes
or in the homes of relatives

(2) End the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage
(3) Prevent and reduce the incidence of out of
wedlock pregnancies and establish annual
numerical goals for preventing and reducing
the incidence of these pregnancies
(4) Encourage the formation and maintenance
of two parent families
(None) Authorized solely under prior law;
otherwise inconsistent with purposes of TANF

(Other) Categories labeled “other”

Spending Categories
Basic Assistance (excluding Relative Foster
Care Maintenance Payments and Adoption and
Guardianship Subsidies); Relative Foster Care
Maintenance Payments and Adoption and
Guardianship Subsidies; PreKindergarten/Head Start; Refundable Earned
Income Tax Credits;
Non-EITC Refundable State Tax Credits;
Non-Recurrent Short Term Benefits;
Supportive Services; Services for Children and
Youth; Family Support/Family Preservation/
Reunification Services; Adoption Services;
Additional Child Welfare Services; Home
Visiting Programs
Subsidized Employment; Education and
Training; Additional Work Activities; Work
Supports; Child Care (Assistance and NonAssistance); Financial Education and Asset
Development
Prevention of Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancies
Fatherhood and Two-Parent Family Formation
and Maintenance Programs
Foster Care Payments; Juvenile Justice
Payments; Emergency Assistance Authorized
Solely Under Prior Law; Child Welfare or
Foster Care Services; Juvenile Justice Services;
Emergency Services Authorized Solely Under
Prior Law
Other, non-assistance activities that not
included in other categories
Administrative Costs; Assessment/Service
Provision; Systems

(Administrative) Administrative and program
management costs
(Transfer to CCDF) TANF Funds transferred
to the Child Care and Development Fund
Transferred to CCDF Discretionary
Discretionary
(Transfer to SSBG) TANF Funds transferred
Transferred to SSBG
to the Social Services Block Grant
Source: Spending categories and full descriptions from The Office of Family Assistance’s TANF
Financial Data – FY 2016; TANF Goals found at Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2015
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Figure 2

Figure 3

Number of Spending Categories
per TANF Goal

Average Percentage of TANF
Funding Spent per Goal
60%
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14
12
10
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4
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0

Source: Spending categories and funding allocation by category for Figures 2 and 3 from The
Office of Family Assistance’s TANF Financial Data – FY 2016

Pairing spending categories with the goals is important because it allows more
straightforward analysis of the consequences of how states are implementing TANF.
Instead of attempting to compare all 32 spending categories across 46 states, this method
combines several narrow categories into groupings that are more comprehensive and
easy-to-understand. For instance, instead of considering Subsidized Employment,
Education and Training, Additional Work Activities, Work Supports, Child Care
(Assistance and Non-Assistance), and Financial Education and Asset Development
separately, they are all combined and considered together as every spending category
associated with TANF’s second goal. This also ties the consideration of funding back to
the original four goals of the policy itself. I analyzed differences between red and blue
states by running a one-way analysis of variance to determine whether there is a
statistically significant difference between how red and blue states were distributing
funds to each category in 2016.
Divorce and out-of-wedlock birth rates were collected for all 46 states for the
years 1996 (pre-TANF), 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. The Centers for Disease
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Control and Prevention (cdc.gov) has divorce rates (per 1,000 total population residing in
area) by state (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services 2017) for most years since
1990. No data was available for 1996, so divorce rates in 1995 were used. Using 1995 is
acceptable because it still falls before TANF was implemented. The Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention also had data for percentage of births to unmarried mothers (outof-wedlock births), but only for 2005, 2014, 2015, and 2016 (“Percentage of Births to
Unmarried Mothers by State” 2018). The data used for out-of-wedlock births for the
other years came from Kids Count Data Center (2017), who sources their data to Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. Rates were compared using two-way ANOVA tests
comparing 1996 to 2016 to test differences before and after TANF was implemented as
well as differences between red states to blue states in both years.
Table 3
Variables and Definitions
Variable
Variable Name
Type
Blue State
Independent

Definition
Any state that selected the Democratic nominee for
President in four or more elections since 1996

Red State

Independent

Any state that selected the Republican nominee for
President in four or more elections since 1996

Out-of-Wedlock
Birth Rate

Dependent

Percentages of births to unmarried mothers

Divorce Rate

Dependent

Number of divorces per 1,000 total population in area
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
There was a lot of variation in funding allocation even between states with the
same party identification. For example, Delaware allocated only 20.83% of its total
TANF funds to the first goal where Maryland used 75.79% despite both being
predominantly Democratic states on the east coast (Table 3). Similarly, North Dakota
distributed 20.21% of its total funds to the first goal, but Georgia used an astounding
84.09% and they are both predominantly Republican states (Table 3). The enormous
differences between the lowest percentages of total funding allocated to each goal and the
highest within red and blue states is responsible for the wide standard deviations. The
differences are smaller in the third and fourth goal, but this is largely due to the fact much
less TANF funding is used for these goals in general (Table 3).
On average, blue states spent more on the first, second, and third goal as well as
in the other category where red states spent more on the fourth goal, categories
authorized solely under prior law (none), and administrative costs (Table 3). Red states
also transferred more funds to both the CCDF Discretionary and the SSBG (Table 3).
However, because of large variation within states of the same party identification, the
only difference that reached statistical significance at the .05 level was the difference
between spending allocated to categories authorized solely under prior law (none) in red
and blue states; red states spent significantly more in these categories (Table 4). This
suggests that other variables, such as state wealth, geographic region, and religiosity
would likely provide more insight about differences in TANF funding than state ideology
alone.
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Table 4
TANF Funding Allocation per Goal by State Color, 2016
TANF Goal/
Justification

State Color

Mean
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
49.60
Blue
16.24
20.83
75.79
(3.46)
Goal 1
47.21
Red
16.45
20.21
84.09
(3.36)
24.09
Blue
16.40
4.33
65.61
(3.50)
Goal 2
18.78
Red
8.018
4.00
34.46
(1.64)
2.06
Blue
4.51
0.00
16.11
(0.96)
Goal 3
0.30
Red
0.42
0.00
1.66
(0.09)
0.67
Blue
1.34
0.00
4.69
(0.29)
Goal 4
0.76
Red
1.21
0.00
4.88
(0.25)
1.45
Blue
1.85
0.00
5.05
(0.40)
None
9.47
Red
13.29
0.00
54.42
(2.71)
2.59
Blue
5.72
0.00
22.92
(1.22)
Other
2.34
Red
5.62
0.00
21.31
(1.15)
11.22
Blue
7.76
2.75
36.55
(1.65)
Administrative
11.50
Red
8.35
2.75
42.61
(1.70)
5.32
Blue
5.35
0.00
15.81
(1.14)
Transfer to CCDF
5.98
Red
7.53
0.00
20.54
(1.54)
3.00
Blue
2.35
0.00
7.03
0.50
Transfer to SSBG
3.66
Red
3.30
0.00
9.63
(0.67)
Note: N=46; 22 blue states, 24 red states. Numbers in cells are percentages that illustrate average
percentage of funding allocated to each goal by state color. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 5
Differences in Average Funding Allocation per Goal by State Color, 2016
TANF Goal/
Justification

Sum of
Mean
Squares
Square F
Between Groups (Combined)
65.718
65.718 .246
Linear Term
Unweighted
65.718
65.718 .246
Goal 1
Weighted
65.718
65.718 .246
Within Groups
11758.54 267.240
Total
11824.26
Between Groups (Combined)
323.97
323.973 2.001
Linear Term
Unweighted
323.97
323.973 2.001
Goal 2
Weighted
323.97
323.973 2.001
Within Groups
7124.91
161.930
Total
7448.89
Between Groups (Combined)
35.25
35.249 3.593
Linear Term
Unweighted
35.25
35.249 3.593
Goal 3
Weighted
35.249
35.249 3.593
Within Groups
431.659
9.810
Total
466.909
Between Groups (Combined)
.078
.078
.048
Linear Term
Unweighted
.078
.078
.048
Goal 4
Weighted
.078
.078
.048
Within Groups
71.465
1.624
Total
71.543
Between Groups (Combined)
738.000
738.000 7.848**
Linear Term
Unweighted
738.000
738.000 7.848**
None
Weighted
738.000
738.000 7.848**
Within Groups
4137.521 94.035
Total
4875.521
Between Groups
(Combined)
.720
.720
.022
Linear Term
Unweighted
.720
.720
.022
Other
Weighted
.720
.720
.022
Within Groups
1414.366 32.145
Total
1415.086
Between Groups
(Combined)
.905
.905
.014
Linear Term
Unweighted
.905
.905
.014
Admin
Weighted
.905
.905
.014
Within Groups
2867.272 65.165
Total
2868.177
Between Groups
(Combined)
5.013
5.013
.116
Linear Term
Unweighted
5.013
5.013
.116
CCDF
Weighted
5.013
5.013
.116
Within Groups
1904.992 43.295
Total
1910.005
Between Groups
(Combined)
5.090
5.090
.611
Linear Term
Unweighted
5.090
5.090
.611
SSBG
Weighted
5.090
5.090
.611
Within Groups
366.626
8.332
Total
371.716
Note: States are grouped by color; F represents the differences in average funding allocation
percentage between and within states by color group.
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* p<0.05, ** p<0.01

While the only category that reached statistical significance at the .05 level was
none, this is still an important finding. This provides evidence that red states are generally
using more of their block grant to fund activities that are authorized solely under prior
law (AFDC) and considered inconsistent with the purposes of TANF than blue states.
Combined with evidence that states like Louisiana and Texas are using welfare funds to
fill budget holes and other purposes, it provides reason to further question how states are
using TANF funds (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2016; Uri 2017). The
likelihood of TANF being successful decreases if states are diverting funds intended to
accomplish the program’s goals to programs that have little to do with the program at all.
This is especially true when the already very limited source of federal funding is taken
into consideration.
In addition to looking at differences in funding priorities between red and blue
states, I wanted to gauge rates of out-of-wedlock births and divorce in red and blue states
before and after TANF was implemented in order to analyze social implications of the
program. While changes in rates cannot be solely attributed to TANF, it is still
informative to look at general trends because although it provides less insight about other
reasons why rates might be changing, such as the increasing trend of cohabitation, it can
still help determine whether TANF has been successful in its third and fourth goals.
There has been a steady increase in the rate of out-of-wedlock births in both red
and blue states (Table 5) since TANF’s advent. This could be because of the increased
rate of cohabitation, but is still illustrative of the welfare system’s inability to decrease
out-of-wedlock births. Under TANF, each state is supposed to “Establish goals and take
action to prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and establish
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numerical goals for reducing the illegitimacy of ratio of the state” (P.L. 104-193 § 401).
This can include any program that provides “sex education or abstinence education and
family planning services” (Department of Health & Human Services Office of Family
Assistance 2018). Because this goal is so broad, states have a lot of flexibility in creating
programs under it, so comparing specific programs between states would likely provide
more insight about differences between red and blue states than comparing funding
distribution.
Table 6
Average Out-of-Wedlock Births by State Color and Year
State Color
Blue

Red

Total

Year

Mean

Std. Deviation

1996

31.05

5.09

2016

38.34

5.83

1996

31.21

6.34

2016

39.77

7.63

1996

31.13

5.71

2016

39.09

6.79

Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of births to unmarried mothers. N=46; 22 blue states
each year, 24 red states each year.

The reason studying program implementation within each state would be
informative is because it is possible more conservative states are inclined to institute
abstinence-only sex education where more liberal states implement comprehensive sex
education programs. Two states could divert very similar amounts of funding to programs
intended to reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock births, but the nature of these
programs might be affecting the rate more than funding itself. Additionally, very minimal
amounts of TANF funding are diverted to the third goal so differences in out-of-wedlock
rates before and after its implementation are unlikely related to the program itself. It is
impossible to know if states allocated more funds to the third goal of TANF in general,
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they would have rates of out-of-wedlock births that were significantly different than they
were before TANF was implemented. While it is possible to compare states with the
highest levels of funding in this category to states with the lowest, the findings would still
be limited because the average percentage of funding allocated to this goal in 2016 was
less than 5% (Table 3).
Differences in out-of-wedlock birth rates were only statistically significant for the
variable year (1996 vs. 2016) (Table 6). State color and the interaction variable between
state color and year were not statistically significant (Table 6). This means the out-ofwedlock birth rate was significantly higher in 2016 than 1996, but there was no
significant difference between out-of-wedlock birth rates between red and blue states
even when the state color was interacted with the year. Because neither the difference in
TANF funding between red and blue states and the difference in out-of-wedlock birth
rate between states is significant, it is unlikely the change seen between 1996 and 2016 is
due to TANF. Instead, it provides evidence that TANF has had little impact on out-ofwedlock birth rates and births to unmarried mothers have simply continued to rise the
way they have since the 1940s. This relationship makes sense given the limited amount
of funds allotted to TANF’s third goal across all states on average.
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Table 7
Differences in Out-of-Wedlock Birth Rates by State Color and Year
Type III Sum of
Squares

Degrees of
Freedom

Mean Square

F

1479.53

3

493.177

12.327**

113075.73

1

113075.725

2826.395**

14.40

1

14.401

.360

1443.32

1

1443.315

36.077**

9.10

1

9.087

.227

Error

3520.62

88

40.007

Total

118401.24

92

5000.15

91

Variable
Corrected Model
Intercept
State Color
Year
State Color * Year

Corrected Total

a

Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of births to unmarried mothers. N=46, 22 blue states
each year, 24 red states each year.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
a. R Squared = .296 (Adjusted R Squared = .272)

Unlike out-of-wedlock birth rates, divorce rates have actually fallen since 1996 in
red and blue states alike. This has been documented in several places (e.g. Abrams 2016;
Anderson 2016; Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2017). In 1996, the average
divorce rate—measured per 1,000 total population in area—was 4.63 and in 2016 it had
dropped to 3.18 (Table 7). The average divorce rate was higher in red states than in blue
states in both 1996 and 2016 (Table 7). Differences in divorce rates were statistically
significant between state color and year, but not for the interaction variable state
color*year. The reason the interaction variable is not statistically significant is probably
because the other variables alone account for the variance. It was included to keep out-ofwedlock birth and divorce rate analysis consistent. Divorce rates were significantly
higher in 1996 than 2016 as well as higher in red states compared to blue states.
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Table 8
Average Divorce Rate by State Color and Year
State Color
Blue

Red

Total

Year

Mean

Std. Deviation

1996

4.10

1.35

2016

2.89

0.65

1996

5.15

0.96

2016

3.42

0.63

1996

4.63

1.26

2016

3.18

.69

Note: Dependent variable is divorce rate, measured per 1,000 total population in area. N=43 in
1996: 21 blue states and 22 red states; N=40 in 2016: 18 blue states and 22 red states. Missing
data omitted from sample.

While the decrease in divorce rate findings are interesting, this does not mean
TANF has effectively reduced the incidence of divorce. In fact, red states spend more on
the fourth goal than blue states (although this difference is statistically insignificant), but
on average have higher rates of divorce. Additionally, the maximum percentage of total
TANF funds allocated to the fourth goal in any state is less than 5%. It seems impossible
that less than 5% of total TANF funding could reduce divorce rates nationally at
statistically significant levels. Finally, programs can include anything from marriage
education programs to “public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage”
(Department of Health & Human Services Office of Family Assistance 2018), so further
analysis of specific programs within each state would be necessary to gain insight about
whether TANF played a role in these differences at all.
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Table 9
Differences in Divorce Rates by State Color and Year
Type III Sum of
Squares

Degrees of
Freedom

Mean Square

F

58.278

3

19.426

21.85**

1247.000

1

1247.000

1402.30**

State Color

12.851

1

12.851

14.45**

Year

44.349

1

44.349

49.87**

State Color * Year

1.349

1

1.349

1.517

Error

70.251

79

.889

Total

1413.680

83

Corrected Total

128.529

82

Source
Corrected Model
Intercept

a

Note: Dependent variable is divorce rate, measured per 1,000 total population in area. N=43 in
1996: 21 blue states and 22 red states; N=40 in 2016: 18 blue states and 22 red states. Missing
data omitted from sample.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
a. R Squared = .453 (Adjusted R Squared = .433)
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CONCLUSION
The question of legislating morality is a complicated one; the normative
discussion about whether or not government should attempt it—as they did in the 1996
law—is an interesting one, but equally important is deciding whether government can
even do so effectively when they do try. TANF’s value-laden goals, such as increased
formation and maintenance of two-parent families, are based on studies that have
associated certain family structures with better economic prospects (e.g. Murray 2012;
Putnam 2016; Wax and Alexander 2017). Even work promotion, which is a huge
component of TANF, has been tied to ideas about responsible fatherhood (e.g. Curran
and Abrams 2000). The idea was that by incentivizing certain family structures and
values, families that participated in TANF programs would become economically
independent through incentives that pushed them to take the “traditional” form of the
family. On its face, this idea holds a certain degree of merit. However, there are several
problems with TANF, especially in its role as a morality policeman.
My original interest in comparing red and blue states came from studies noting
substantial differences in the number of people in poverty receiving TANF benefits
within each state (e.g. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 2017) and studies about
differences in family values within each state (e.g. Cahn and Carbone 2010). Initially, I
thought because red states have been found diverting TANF funds to programs
authorized solely under prior law (AFDC) and to fill budget holes (Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities 2016; Uri 2017) social outcomes, such as higher rates of divorce, were
higher in these states because they were not adhering to TANF’s original goals. However,
there is little evidence for this theory. Instead, both red and blue states seem to allocate
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similar percentages of their TANF funding to each of the four primary goals of TANF.
There were statistically significant differences in how much red and blue states were
allocating the “none” category, providing some evidence that red states are more inclined
to allocate funds to programs that are authorized solely under AFDC and are otherwise
inconsistent with the purposes of TANF. This provides limited evidence for my first
hypothesis, but it is unlikely this difference has greatly contributed to social differences
between states. More careful consideration of the types of specific programs under this
category would be required to understand why this trend is occurring. Additionally, while
there do seem to be differences between how red and blue states are implementing
TANF, analysis of funding allocation alone cannot flesh out these differences.
There was a statistical significant difference between rates of out-of-wedlock
births and divorces in 1996 and 2016, providing evidence for my second hypothesis. Outof-wedlock rates have increased, which is not a surprise considering the upward trend of
this phenomena since the 1940s when it was first measured (Bachrach 1998; Doyle
2006). This also provides evidence TANF has been unable to reduce the rate of births to
unmarried mothers, despite it being a primary goal of TANF with incentives provided to
states that reached “annual numerical goals” (P.L. 104-193 § 401). At least in part, this is
due to the limited funding states have decided to allocate to this goal. On average, blue
states diverted only 2.06% and red states 0.30% of their total funding in 2016 to
programs specifically intended to reduce out-of-wedlock birth rates. States are free to
allocate funds however they deem fit as long as they justify it with any one of the four
goals; it is obvious most states have decided to fund the first and second goals of TANF
much more frequently than the third and fourth. This makes sense given the nature of
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each goal. The first and second goals, which provide basic assistance and job preparation
activities to recipients, are much easier to implement with funding alone. While agreeing
a reduction in out-of-wedlock births and divorces might be economically advantageous, it
is much more difficult to accomplish these goals; even knowing where to start seems
impossible. Some public policy choices, such as establishing abstinence-only sex
education programs statewide, might contribute to rates of out-of-wedlock births, but it is
unlikely TANF has been very effective at influencing these rates at all.
In contrast, divorce rates have dropped since 1996, which also provides evidence
for my second hypothesis, but again, the reach of this finding is limited. TANF aimed to
increase the maintenance of two-parent families and a reduction in divorce rates supports
this goal. However, despite linear association, TANF is probably not the cause for this
change for several reasons. First, although statistically insignificant, red states spend
more on average on the fourth goal than blue states, which is inconsistent with the
statistically significant finding that blue states tend to have lower rates of divorce.
Second, like the third goal, very limited amounts of total funding are used for the
purposed of the fourth goal. In any state, the maximum percentage of total funds
allocated to programs designed to increase the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families was less than 5% in 2016. The likelihood that less than 5% of funding could
reduce divorce rates nationally at statistically significant levels is miniscule. Third,
despite divorce rates falling, differences between classes have persisted—with people in
lower classes more likely to get divorced than their upper-class counterparts (e.g. Abrams
2016; Murray 2012; Putnam 2016). Finally, TANF programs under this goal range from
marriage education programs to “public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage”
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(Department of Health & Human Services Office of Family Assistance 2018), so analysis
of specific program implementation within each state would be required to provide
additional insight about whether TANF played any role in these differences.
The findings for my third hypothesis are mixed. There are statistically significant
differences in divorce rates between red and blue states with red states having higher
divorce rates on average. As Kristof (2017) pointed out, this is interesting because it
appears blue states are practicing “the family values red states preach.” However, this
statement is somewhat misleading. Divorce rates might be higher in red states not due to
lack of conservative values, but because the populations are less educated, poorer, and
more likely to marry early (e.g. Kristof 2017). Unlike divorces, there were not
statistically significant differences in out-of-wedlock birth rates between red and blue
states. This statistic likely does not tell the whole story, though. Other studies that have
suggested higher teenage marriage rates and birth rates occurring in red states could help
add another dimension (e.g. Cahn and Carbone 2010). Again, though, these rates are
probably not driven by TANF funding differences between red and blue states because
the percentage of total funds provided for either of these goals is inadequate to make any
real difference.
Like Cahn and Carbone (2010), I think “genuine family transformation” will not
occur “without addressing the growing inequality that has exacerbated the pressures on
family life,” such as the pressure on poorer families, who might benefit from delayed
childbearing, to marry quickly in fear of marital prospects declining (14). With limited
funding, TANF can only do so much. It is impossible for the program to provide basic
assistance, work training, and attempt to incentivize two-parent family formation without
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serious reform. Moreover, other public policies, such as sex education in schools and
increased access to inexpensive birth control, might be more effective for obtaining
family formation goals than TANF. If the federal government is still serious about the
value-laden goals associated with welfare reform, careful consideration about the
program’s ability to accomplish these goals needs to be examined more closely.
The third and fourth goals of TANF have not been implemented in a way that has
yielded results in rates of births to unmarried mothers or divorces, but this does not mean
it has failed entirely as a program. With capped federal funding that has grown little since
its introduction in FY 1997, the mixed results are understandable. Potential TANF
reforms could include increased federal funding, especially to poorer states, as well as
increased cooperation among states. Federal funding caps should be evaluated with
consideration of inflation and current poverty levels. If red states have lower MOE
requirements on average, causing fewer poor children to receive aid, careful
consideration of federal TANF funding distribution should be reevaluated—based not on
the previous year’s MOE within each state, but on an analysis that determines which
states could benefit from additional funding or program restructuring. Finally,
cooperation between states could help replicate programs that are working and eradicate
or reform programs that are not.
Any TANF reform debate would require understanding that providing basic
assistance, as AFDC did, while simultaneously attempting to incentivize work ethic and
family values is very difficult, if not impossible, especially without additional funding
and resources. Recognition of potential failings of the program should be considered
cautiously. Concluding that TANF has the means to accomplish all four goals is unfair to
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the program and deeper understanding about the root of its shortcomings is the first step
in working towards effective reform. Furthermore, it is worth considering whether
TANF’s goals are being ignored by states altogether because of their flexibility in
program implementation. Instead of driving welfare implementation within states, the
original four goals of TANF do not seem to matter. Alternative state motives, which often
seem to have little relation to the program’s original intent, have taken priority.
Future research should carefully consider metrics of “success” when analyzing
TANF. Previous research shortcoming stem from inconsistent measures as well as
measurement difficulties that make comparing results difficult. This project considered
new components of success, which are often ignored in the welfare debate. Political
conservatives and moderate Democrats saw AFDC as a failure because it left the nation’s
poorest dependent on government assistance instead of helping them reach selfsufficiency. TANF was a departure from previous welfare programs because its goals
were driven by the bipartisan agreement to incentivize values associated with positive
economic results, such as work ethic and traditional family formation. However, there is
little evidence that the program has been able to accomplish these goals, which might
suggest the bipartisan consensus has dissolved. Because of this, simply considering
caseloads or economic trends such as poverty rates alone is not sufficient in determining
whether TANF was successful. Steps towards more comprehensive analysis of TANF’s
goals and outcomes need to be considered based on deeper understanding of what the
program set out to accomplish in the first place.
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